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Faculty and Deans

ARTICLES
AN ESSAY ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LANGUAGE

Frederick Schauer*
Many contemporary constitutional scholars have explored
the extent to which, if at all, judges should go "outside of' or "beyond" the constitutional text for decisional principles in constitutional cases. 1 Although the resulting discussions have been highly
illuminating, I do not wish to deal directly with this controversy
here. Rather, I propose to discuss what is logically a prior question. For before we can argue intelligently about whether to go
outside of the text, we ought to explore the meaning of the words
inside the text. Only then will we know what counts as going
"outside," and until then, it is not clear that there even is an
outside because "inside" and "outside" are relative terms.
• Cutler Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. A.B., 1967, M.B.A.,
1968, Danmouth; J.D., 1972, Harvard.
The research and writing of this essay were supponed by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. 1 am also indebted to Philip Devine, Kent
Greenawalt, Margit Livingston, Mary Jane Morrison, Stanley Paulson, Manin Willard, and William Van Alstyne for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. The contemporary jargon draws a distinction between ·~interpretivism" and
"noninterpretivism," but this is merely one characterization of an issue that predates
the current labels. See generally J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DiSTRUST 1-14 (1980);
.Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204
(1980); Grey, /)o We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Grey, Unwritten Constitution]; Grey, Origins of the Unwritten
Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV.
843 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Grey, Origins); Linde, Judges, Critics and the Realist
Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972); Monaghan, Of"Liberty" and "Property," 62 CoRNELL L. REv. 405 (1977); Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 117 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Monaghan, The Constitution];
Perry, Substantive Oue Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases,
71 Nw. U.L. REV. 417 (1976); Richards, Human Rights as the Unwrillen Constitution:
The Problem of Change and Stability in Constitutional Interpretation, 4 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 295 (1979); Constitutional Adjudication and J)emocratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 259 (1981); Judicial Review versus Oemocracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981).
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We assume, perhaps too easily, that the language of the Constitution is neither the source of, nor the answer to, our problems,
and we then head off into the forbidding jungles of history, political theory, moral philosophy, public policy, and what have you
without any clear guide. An examination of the words in the Constitution has been merely the hors d'oeuvre, with high theory as
the main course.
There is nothing unseemly about high theory in this sense.
Nevertheless, we need to look at the words of the Constitution as
language, and we need to examine closely some of our rarely
questioned presuppositions about constitutional language. Although this examination logically is prior to any broader interpretation of the Constitution, it has received surprisingly little
concentrated attention in the literature. 2
Constitutional cogniscenti talk about "gaps," "great silences,"
"vague language," and "open texture" as if these were concepts of
little controversy. 3 But what makes the requirement that the President be of "the Age of thirty five Years" specific and the requirement of "equal protection of the laws" vague? Why are there
"loopholes" in the Internal Revenue Code, but not in the Constitution? In order to understand and to attempt to answer questions
like these, we need a theory of constitutional language as much as
we need theories of constitutional law.
The Constitution is, after all, a writing, 4 and at bottom we are
2. One notable exception is Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What
it Always Meant?, 77 CoLUM. L. REV. 1029 (1977). See also Alexander, Modern
Equal Protection Tlteories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42 OHIO ST.
L.J. 3, 4-16 (1981); Smith, Rights, Right Answers, and the Constructive Model ofMorality, 5 Soc. THEORY AND PRAC. 409, 421-25 (1980). Philosophy is at the moment having a_.good run in the constitutional arena, but, with few exceptions, it is moral
philosophy rather than the philosophy of language that is taken to be the most useful
for constitional inquiries. Given that we have a wrilten constitution, this lack of attention from the perspective of the philosophy of language seems a bit surprising.
Although not directed specifically towards constitutional interpretation, there has
been some recent attention to legal language from a philosophical perspective.
Moore, Tire Semantics ofJudging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151 (1981); Stone, From aLanguage Perspective, 90 YALE L.J. 1149 (1981).
3. In addition to the works cited supra note 1, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW at iii (1978) ("[T]he Constitution is an intentionally incomplete, often
deliberately indeterminate structure for the participatory evolution of political ideals
and governmental practices."); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (Supp.
1979) ("open-textured" provisions such as "equal protection" and "due process"; use
of "broad terminology" in the Constitution). See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
242 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("large gaps in the Constitution"); H.P. Hood &
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949) (Jackson, J.) ("great silences of the
Constitution"); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 413 (1946) ("great constitutional gaps").
4. Although it illustrates the focus both of this inquiry and of my conclusions,
the phrase in the text is, at this stage, question-begging. For even if we note that the
Constitution is written, what does this say about the constitution? This question can
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interpreting the words of a written document. But how do we do
this? What does it mean to "interpret" a constitutional provision?
What do we mean when we say that a constitutional provision
"means" something? How do we start such an analysis? These
are hard and important questions, and we should not dismiss
them as irrelevant philosophical speculation. Indeed, answers to
these questions underlie any theory of constitutional adjudication,
and this Essay attempts to bring some of these answers to the surface for closer inspection.
My intention here is not to offer a completely mature theory
of constitutional language. Rather, I wish to explore the way in
which the conventions of language affect constitutional theory. At
the end of t~s Essay, I conclude that constitutional language acts
as a significant restraint on constitutional decision, but I will not
have developed a complete theory of constitutional language
which directs any particular substantive outcomes. A complete
theory will have to wait for another time.
I.

ON THE SUPPOSED UNIQUENESS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE

In his pioneering work on legal language, H.L.A. Hart argued
that legal language is fundamentally different from ordinary language.5 According to Hart, if one fails to recognize the unique
context and the distinct presuppositions of legal discourse, then
one commits the errors of formalism or conceptualism-giving to
words in the abstract an aura of authority and of unique reference
inconsistent with the view of language as an activity determined
and governed by social rules. 6 If, as Hart and his philosophical
be expressed in terms of how much of the constitution is contained or captured in the
(written) Constitution. It is this question that this essay is intended to address. Positing the question in this way suggests the Continental distinction between a material
constitution and a formal constitution. See H. KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW
222-24 (M. Knight trans. 2d ed. 1967).
5. Hart's original foray into the field was The Ascription of Responsibility and
Rights, in Lome AND LANGUAGE (First Series) 145-66 (A. Flew ed. 1955). Hart's
later repudiation of this strictly performative view of legal language (H.L.A. HART,
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY V (1968)) was the result of the more complex, presupposition-oriented theory first put forth in Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 LAW Q. REv. 37 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Hart, Definition and Theory],
and embellished in H.L.A. HART, THE CoNCEPT OF LAW 13-17 (1961). See also Cohen, Theory and Definition in Jurisprudence, 29 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc. (SUPP.) 213
(1955); Hart, Theory and Definition in Jurisprudence, 29 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc.
(SUPP.) 239 (1955). See generally N. MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART (1981); Hacker,
Hart's Philosophy of Law, and Baker, Defeasibility and Meaning, in LAW, MoRALITY,
AND SociETY: EsSAYS IN HoNOUR OF H.L.A. HART I, 26 (P. Hacker & J. Raz eds.
1977).
6. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 5, at 126-27; Sartorius, Hart's Concept of Law,
in MORE ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 131-61 (R. Summers ed. 1971). See also G.
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contemporaries supposed, meaning is use, 7 then legal use ought to
produce different meanings than a physicist's use, a sociologist's
use, or the use of the man on the Clapham omnibus. 8 And, just as
legal language is different in kind from ordinary language, constitutional language may be different from other legallanguage. 9 In
fact, this hypothesis implicitly undergirds many different theories
of constitutional interpretation. 10 The various theories of a "living" or "changeable" constitution each presuppose a view of the
uniqueness of constitutional language, setting it off from the linguistic raw material with which lawyers normally deal. 11
GoTTLIEB, THE LOGIC OF CHOICE 48 (1968); Hart, Problems o.fPhilosophy o.fLaw, in
6 ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 266, 270 (P. Edwards ed. 1967); Stone, Ratiocination Not Rationalisation, 74 MIND 463 (1965).
7. See L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS§§ 30, 43, 120, 138,
340, 532 (G. Anscombe trans. 1958). Although Wittgenstein was the guiding light of
the "meaning is use" approach, that approach was in fact the standard under which
most of Anglo-American philosophy operated in the 1950s and 1960s. See, e.g., J.
AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & M. Sbisa 2d ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as J. AUSTIN, WORDs); J. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES (3d ed.
1979); Grice, Meaning, 66 PHIL. REv. 377 (1957); Strawson, Propositions, Concepts,
and Logical Truth, 7 PHIL. Q. 15 (1957).
8. The man on the Clapham omnibus is most frequently taken to be the prototypical reasonable man for purposes of tort law, see, e.g., Bolam v. Friem Hospital
Management Committee, I W.L.R. 582, 586-87 (Q.B. 1957), but he is also the ordinary speaker of ordinary English. See, e.g., Woodhouse A.C. Israel Cocoa Ltd. S.A.
v. Nigerian Produce Marketing Co., 2 Q.B. 23, 63 (C.A. 1971). Although we need not
recount Hart's arguments, those arguments do suggest that constitutional language
may possess a uniqueness of its own.
For summary and critique, see N. MACCORMICK, supra note 5; Baker, supra note 5; Hacker, supra note 5. See also Shuman,
Jurisprudence and the Analysis o.f Fundamental Legal Terms, 8 J. LEGAL EDuc. 437
(1956).
9. "[l]t was by no means self-evident in 1789 that judges should use the same
techniques in the construction of constitutional provisions as in the interpretation of
ordinary statutory and decisional sources." H. Jones, The Common Law in the l/nited
States: English Themes and American Variations, in POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL CONTINUITY 134 (1976). See also Bridwell, Book Review, 1978 DUKE L.J. 907,
914-15 (reviewing R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977)).
10. Thus, when John Marshall observed that "we must never forget that it is a
constitution we are expounding," McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
407 (1819), he was adopting the thesis discussed in the text, although McCulloch is
significantly obscure in that Marshall did not explain in what way constitutional interpretation was unique. See Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69
HARV. L. REv. 217 (1955). For a sampling of the various theories that embody this
view in one way or other, see C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969); C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY
(1969); Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REv. I (1934);
Murphy,· The Art o.f Constitutional Interpretation: A Preliminary Showing, in EsSAYS
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 130 (M. Harmon ed. 1978).
II. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131-49 (1980); H. McBAIN, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (1927); Brest, supra note I; Grey, supra note I;
Munzer & Nickel, supra note 2; Perry, supra note I; Miller, Notes on the Concept o.fthe
"Living" Constitution, 31 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 881 (1963); Reich, The Living. Constitution and the Court's Role, in HUGO BLACK AND THE SUPREME COURT 133 (S. Strick-
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There seem to be readily apparent differences between constitutional language and other legal language. Grandiloquent
phrases like "freedom of speech," "equal protection of the laws,"
"due process of law," and "privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States" have few counterparts in the Internal Revenue Code or the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.
Indeed, many constitutional provisions are more than merely indeterminate. They have a powerful emotive component. The
Constitution is more an eloquently written manifesto 12 than it is a
code, and in many ways we are much better for that. But the eloquence and emotive force of the document further reinforce the
view that the Constitution's words are as different as they are special. To construe its language too literally or too much like the
language in a conventional statute would be both unrealistic and·
inconsistent with its deeper purposes. In some ways, the Constitution is a metaphor.t3
Not unrelated to the Constitution's metaphorical quality is its
permanence. Statutes are frequently amended, and the common
law is continually changing, but the Constitution has a special sort
of durability. Not only is amending the Constitution extremely
difficult, but we also seem remarkably averse to doing so. 14 Many
.limd ed. 1967); Richards, supra note I. Contra Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living
Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693 (1976). In terms of a theory of meaning, some of
the foregoing theses could be said to assume that the meaning of constitutional provisions changes over time, while others would hold that the meaning remains the same
while the applications change. Exploring that distinction at this point would serve
little purpose, because it and related issues are the focus of the balance of this Essay.
12. In this sense, the Constitution combines both argument and aspiration with a
statement of existing principles, not unlike Joel Feinberg's "manifesto sense" of a
right. J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 67 (1973). I derive some support for this
view from the similarity between the largely enforceable American Constitution and
the many largely unenforceable international treaties, declarations, and conventions
dealing with human rights. Learned Hand, of course, treated this manifesto sense as
virtually the sole function of some constitutional provisions. L. HAND, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 33-34 (1958).
13. One of the purposes of a metaphor is to get us to think in different ways, to
block intentionally some of our routine thought processes. See, e.g., I. HuNGERLAND,
POETIC DISCOURSE 127 (1958); Black, Metaphor, in MODELS AND METAPHORS 25
(1962). It seems to me quite likely that this process is at least one of the implicit
purposes of the Constitution, but proving that hypothesis is beyond the purview of
this Essay.
14. Fear of the possible results of judicial interpretation may explain a large part
of this aversion. It has been 114 years since any very broad language was added to
the Constitution (the ratification of the fourteenth amendment), and the rough road
travelled by both the Equal Rights Amendment and the various proposed "right to
life" amendments suggests that we may never again add a constitutional provision of
similar openness. Quite possibly, it is only a fortunate historical accident that aggressive judicial review arose only after the enactment of those constitutional provisions
which now occupy most of the Supreme Court's time. Perhaps such active review has,
for all practical purposes, foreclosed the possibility of ever again achieving the consensus necessary to add similar provisions to the Constitution.
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have feared a constitutional convention because too much might
be changed, 15 even though such changes would still require ratification by the states. On the other hand, we certainly do not suspend Congress or the state legislatures for fear that they might
legislate too much-however appealing that suggestion may at
times seem.
Despite these important differences, we would be mistaken to
view constitutional language as a wholly unique creature. The
seemingly intentional openness of many constitutional terms,
upon which most of the supposition about the uniqueness of constitutional language is based, 16 has counterparts in other areas of
law, especially in American law. The generality of "equal protection of the laws" or "the freedom of speech" differs little from the
language in Rule lOb-S of the Securities and Exchange Commission, which prohibits the employment of "any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud." 17 Likewise, the fourth amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable" searches and seizures provides no more
guidance than the Sherman Act's ban on "[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
• • • • " 18 As a result, the task of the courts in putting flesh on the
skeleton of the Constitution is not wholly different from the task
that courts have undertaken in developing the elaborate structure
of tests, rules, and standards that surround and govern the application of the securities laws, the antitrust laws, and many other
statutory schemes. 19
15. See generally Dellinger, The Recurring Question q( the "Limited" Constitutional Convention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623 (1979); Dellinger, Who Controls a Constitutional
Conventlon?-A Response, 1979 DUKE L.J. 999; Fordham, Some Observations Upon
Uneasy American Federalism, 58 N.C.L. REV. 289 (1980); Gunther, The Convention
Method o/Amending the United States Constitution, 14 GA. L. REV. I (1979); Tribe,
Issues Raised By Requesting Congress lo Call a Constitutional Convention to Propose a
Balanced Budget Amendment, 10 PAC. L.J. 627 (1979); Van Alstyne, .Does Article V
Restrict the Slates to Calling Unlimited Conventions Only?-A Leiter 10 a Colleague,
1978 DuKE L.J. 1295; Van Alstyne, The Limited Constitutional Convention-TheRecurring Answer, 1979 DUKE L.J. 985; Note, Good Intentions, New Inventions, and Article V Constitutional Conventions, 58 TEx. L. REV. 131 (1979). The implicit theme of
most of the recent literature, whieh has attracted an all-star lineup of constitutional
scholars, is that an unlimited convention is fraught with danger.
16. See supra note 3. A pervasive problem in attempting to generalize about
constitutional language is that constitutional language is hardly uniform in degree of
generality, in purpose, or in historical origin. This recognition of the diversity of
constitutional language is most prominently associated with Justice Frankfurter. See,
e.g., Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414-15 (1945). See generally H. THOMAS,
FELIX FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH 127-47 (1960).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (1981).
18. 15 U.S.C. § I (1976).
19. Note, for example, the intermingling of examples from both constitutional
and statutory interpretation in E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING
- (1949).
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If the openness of constitutional language does not provide its
uniqueness, perhaps the notion of presupposition, 20 which undergirds Hart's argument in "Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence,"21 can explain the uniqueness. State~ents oflaw, or in law
(as opposed to statements about law}, presuppose the existence of
a legal system, and particular statements of legal rules themselves
contain presuppositions. 22 Thus, the statement "the corporation is
liable in damages" presupposes a body of law creating and defining a "corporation." But presupposition is hardly unique to law.
When we use "home run" or "small slam," we presuppose the systems of baseball and bridge, respectively, and when we use "professor" or "hour examination," we similarly presuppose the
existence of a college or university, which is in tum defined by a
(probably looser) set of constitutive rules. 23 Legal language is not
special because it contains presuppositions, but rather because it
alone contains presuppositions which relate to the existence of a
legal system.
In this sense, then, constitutional language is unique because
it, and no other language, presupposes the existence of a constitution, and incorporates those particular presuppositions which concern the role of a constitution in a given legal system. But this is
not going to get us very far, because the presuppositions of constitutionalism are themselves both vague and contested. Unlike the
specific terms of a general legal system, which, to some extent,
relate to relatively uncontroversial presuppositions about the way
the legal system operates, the terms of a constitution themselves
determine the differences between the constitutional presuppositions and other legal presuppositions. Therefore, an initial search
for constitutional uniqueness reduces itself to circularity because
the presuppositions of a constitutional system are dependent on
our view of the language of a constitution. Perhaps constitutional
language is unique. But we cannot articulate the differences
which make it unique simply by examining the presuppositions of
constitutionalism. Rather, we must examine the language in order
to discover the differences between the presuppositions embedded
20. "When did you stop beating your wife?" contains a prototypical presupposition in that it presupposes, but does not assert, that you have a wife and that you have
beaten her. Presuppositions are not asserted to be true or false, but undergird the
thought and language of people. See also J. AUSTIN, WoRDS, supra note 7, at 48-52;
J. SEARLE, SPEECH AcTs (1969). See generally Strawson, On Referring, 59 MIND 320
(1950).
21. Hart, .Definition and Theory, supra note 5, at 37. See supra note 5.
22. This notion is embodied in Hart's theory of the "internal" point of view.
H.L.A. HART, supra note 5, at 54-60, 84-88, 97-107, 138-44.
23. See J. SEARLE, supra note 20, at 33-42, 184-87. See also Harris, .Do Performatives Still Exist? (Paper presented at the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, March, 1980) (copy on file at UCLA Law Review).
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in that language and the presuppositions included in the language
of statutes or the common law.
These observations on the presuppositional nature of constitutional language are neither interesting nor important enough to
provide the touchstone for a theory of constitutional language.
They show, however, that certain uses of language have distinct
meanings because of the context in which they occur. 24 When an
entomologist talks about "bugs," when a physicist describes something as "solid," and when a logician refers to "implication," each
uses those terms in a more technical and precise sense than the
ordinary person uses them. We know this because we know something about the special context in which entomologists, physicists,
and logicians speak. 25 Similarly, the context in which lawyers talk
determines their use of "real property" (which is not the opposite
of "fake property") or "wrongful" (which refers to conduct that
may have no moral counterpart in ordinary language). Unlike
strictly technical legal terms, such as "habeas corpus," "demurrer," and "curtesy," which have no ordinary language meaning,
the technical uses of "real property" and "wrongful" are ,parasitic
on ordinary language. 26 If this phenomenon occurs in: conventional (non-constitutional) legal language, then the equally parasitic nature of certain constitutional terms, such as "equal
protection of the laws," "free exercise of religion," and "search
and seizure" should not surprise us. These are expressions derived from ordinary language, but their constitutional meaning in
the context of constitutional adjudication diverges in important
ways from the ordinary meaning that first generated each expression. The constitutional presuppositions of constitutional language may not establish the complete uniqueness of constitutional
language, but they do emphasize the context from which the
words take their meaning.
II.

THE INTENTIONAL PARADIGM

Most discussion of constitutional language takes place within
what I call the "intentional paradigm"-the assumption that any
24. On contextual definition, see J. AusTIN, supra note 20; J. SEARLE, supra note
20; L. WriTGENSTEIN, supra note 7; Frankena, Some Aspects of Language, in LANGUAGE, THOUGHT & CULTURE 121-23 (P. Henle ed. 1958); Ryle, Ordinary Language,
in ORDINARY LANGUAGE 24 (V. Chappell ed. 1964). For a somewhat controversial
application of the notion of contextual definition to the problem of obscenity, see
Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity':· An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 61 GEO. L.J. 899 (1979).
25. There has been surprisingly little discussion of technical language in the philosophical literature, but one noteworthy source is Caton, Introduction to PHILOSOPHY
AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE at V (C. Caton ed. 1963).
26. See generally Morrison, Technical Language (and the Law), 10 COLONIAL
LAW. 18 (1980).
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interpretation of the constitutional text must comport with the explicit, implicit, reconstructed, or fictionalized intentions of the
drafters. In its crudest and least plausible version, the intentional
paradigm focuses on the results that the drafters specifically had
in mind. 27 Thus, because we can show that the drafters of the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments intended
to invalidate lengthy imprisonment without trial, we can be confident that we are correct in applying those provisions to that end. 28
Conversely, because we can fairly clearly infer that those same
drafters did not intend to invalidate prejudgment real estate attachment for the purpose of securing a potential money judgment,29 we can be equally confident that we are correct in refusing
to apply the due process clause to invalidate prejudgment real estate attachment. Use of the same methodology would support the
27. The nature of the ratification process makes the search for original intent in
constitutional adjudication especially problematic. Are the states presumed to have
ratified the intent of the drafters as well as the language those drafters wrote? What if
legislative history from state legislatures shows that different states ratified for different reasons? What if the intent of the drafters is unavailable to the states? Given the
nature of my conclusions, I need not attempt to answer these very troubling questions,
but they cannot be avoided by any theory that is tied to original intent.
Even if we put the "whose intent?" question aside, we must still address two
different questions. The first is "What results would the drafters have intended had
they been confronted with the problems and context oftoday's world?" This question
seems largely unanswerable, inviting the most speculative kind of historical psychoanalysis. This formulation of the issue has, however, attracted a substantial following.
See, e.g., L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? 21 (1975); Murphy, Book Review, 87 YALE
L.J. 1752, 1770 (1978).
The other question that could be asked is "What results did the drafters specifically intend?" This question is, at least, one that is possible to answer, although much
of this Essay contends that it is still the wrong question. This question is at the heart
of the much discussed theories of Raoul Berger. R. BERGER, GovERNMENT BY JuDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). The assumption that clear or unmistakable intent, as evidenced in historical documents, is
the exact equivalent of a textual statement to that effect is central to Berger's thesis.
See, e.g., id. at 368; Berger, A Political Scientist as Constitutional Lawyer: A Reply to
Louis Fisher, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 147, 162-63, 167 (1980). See also Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting in part); Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,677-78 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 402-03 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
Among current members of the Supreme Court, Justice Rehnquist most clearly subscribes to the view that original intent is dispositive. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762, 777-86 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634, 649-64 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in Sugarman and also in In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717 (1973)). Because, as should be apparent from all of this Essay, I disagree
with Berger's assumption as to what is the proper question, I have no need to deal
with the issue of whether Berger's own answers to his question are even correct. It is
certainly not abundantly clear that they are. See, e.g., Murphy, supra, at 1754-60.
28. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken
Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
29. See Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 344-51 (1969) (Black,
J., dissenting); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
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first amendment's application to prior restraints and at the same
time justify excluding its application to obscenity, defamation,
commercial speech, and blasphemy.3o
The specific intention theories of constitutional interpretation, of which the writings of Raoul Berger represent the most extreme example, 31 are the least plausible of any of the theories
discussed in this Essay. They are implausible precisely because
they ignore the distinction between the meaning of a rule (such as
a constitutional provision) and the instances of its application. 32
When we draft any rule, we envision certain particular applications of that rule, certain cases where the rule will produce a
particular outcome. We do not merely list these outcomes in a
series of specific commands because we do not see those particular
outcomes as exhaustive. They are only instances of a more general problem, and we analyze the problem to discover some underlying unity in the instances that we wish to treat. 33 We then
formulate the rule to deal with this general unitary problem. By
formulating a rule in general terms, the rule extends, by the nature
of language, further in time or space than those particular applications envisaged by the drafters of the rule.
This is a commonplace observation,3 4 and we can easily im30. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), is the Supreme Court's most explicit statement of the now-repudiated "prior restraints only" interpretation of the
first amendment. /d. at 462. For references to other historical exclusions, see, e.g.,
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877); L.
LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960).
31. See supra note 27.
32. "The provisions of the Federal Constitution, undoubtedly, are pliable in the
sense that in appropriate cases they have the capacity of bringing within their grasp
every new condition which falls within their meaning. But, their meaning is changeless; it is only their application which is extensible." Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 451 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). See
also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (Sutherland, J.);
) T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 124 (8th ed. 1927).
This distinction parallels the philosopher's related distinetions between eonnotation and denotation, and intension and extension. See W. ALSTON, PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE 17 n.8 (1964); J.S. MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC (8th ed. 1904); W. SALMON,
LOGIC 122-29 (2d ed. 1973). See also J. HOSPERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 40-54 (2d ed. 1967). The distinction also parallels those between sense
and reference. See FREGE, On Sense and Reference, in TRANSLATIONS FROM THE
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF GOTTLOB FREGE 58 (P. Geach & M. Black eds. 1952)
("Sense" and "referenee" are the generally accepted English translations of Frege's
"Sinn" and "Bedeutung."). But, not wishing to carry more philosophical baggage
than I must, I will stick to a distinction between the meaning of a rule and the instances of its application.
33. "[A] principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910), quoted
in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, J. joined by Powell
and Stevens, JJ.).
34. See Munzer & Niekel, supra note 2, at 1031; Bridwell, supra note 9, at 914-15.
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agine examples of the distinction between meaning and instances
of application in constitutional interpretation. For example, punishment by electric shocks to the genitalia falls plainly within the
eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments even though the drafters could not have imagined this particular procedure in 1791.3 5
This much is relatively uncontroversial, but it does not take
us very far because, at some point, the new applications are so
different that the meaning has changed. 36 The "meaning" of a
cruel and unusual punishment clause prohibiting only painful and
humiliating punishment is different from one prohibiting capital
punishment. 37 The "meaning" of an equal protection clause
prohibiting only racial discrimination is different from the meaning of an equal protection clause prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of, say, gender, 38 alienage, 39 illegitimacy,40 or wealth. 4 1 And
the meaning of "the freedom of speech" that includes only political argument42 is different from the meaning of ''the freedom of
speech" that includes the right to advertise pharmaceutical
prices43 or the right to display a "For Sale" sign on a front lawn. 44
I am not contending that such shifts in constitutional meaning arc constitutionally impermissible. I am saying only that they
On generality as part of the nature of law, see H.L.A. HART, supra note 5, at 20-23,
234.
35. q: United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (broad extension of concept
of religion for purposes of statutory exemption from conscription for conscientious
objectors). But cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (emphasis on the historical legitimacy of the Amish church).
36. See Munzer & Nickel, supra note 2, at l-31. This seems to have been Justice
Sutherland's point. See supra note 32.
Whether there is a shift in meaning may depend on why a particular provision. is
in the Constitution. The narrower the reason, the more likely it is that a new application will be beyond the scope of that reason and will therefore constitute a shift of
meaning. Conversely, the broader the reason taken to justify the provision in the text,
the more likely it is that subsequent applications will still be within the scope of that
reason, and therefore not represent a change of meaning.
37. See supra note 34. But if you define the first meaning differently, then the
application may involve no shift.
38. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
39. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
40. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
41. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973) (rejecting strict scrutiny).
42. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948), reprinted in A. MEIKLEJOHN, PoLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CoNSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960); BeVier, The First Amendment and Political
Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299
(1978); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 41 IND. L.J. l
(1971); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 196! SuP. CT. REv. 245.
43. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, lne.,
425 u.s. 748 (1976).
44. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
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are shifts in meaning, and thus are neither explained nor justified
by the distinction between the meaning of a rule and the instances
of its application. For such explanation or justification we must
look elsewhere.
The defects of the specific intention approach have been amply documented in the literature,45 and there is little need for me
to belabor these criticisms here. Intriguingly, however, even the
most vehement crities of the specific intention approach still feel
obliged to tether their arguments to some form of original intent.
According to Laurence Tribe46 and Ronald Dworkin47 , for example, the extremely general language in the Constitution conclusively proves the drafters' intent that subsequent generations
should work out their own theories applying such phrases as cruel
and unusual punishment, due process of law, equal protection of
the laws, and so on. John Hart Ely implicitly criticizes wide excursions from the text as a whole, 48 but his argument is as revealing as it is interesting. Ely bases his deference to the text on
the idea that the text constitutes the best evidence of the drafters'
intent. 49 The text, for Ely as for the others, is still a way of bringing forward the intentions of the framers.
Those who argue within the framework of this "intentional
paradigm" appear to operate on the model of the "convention" in
the game of bridge. When bridge players reach a certain level of
proficiency, they begin to use artificial conventions in bidding.
These bids do not represent the intended contract, but rather aim
at describing specific features of the bidder's hand or at asking
questions about the partner's hand. The bids are in a code whose
primary ordinary meaning ("clubs" means clubs) may be irrelevant to the specific contextual use. Most bridge players use simple
conventions like Blackwood or Stayman, and more advanced
players are likely to use complex systems containing a high percentage of so-called "artificial" bids. These systems and conven45. See, e.g., Bridwell, supra note 34; Lusky, "Government By Judiciary':· What
Price Legitimacy?, 6 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 403 (1979); Munzer & Nickel, supra note
2, at 1030-33; Murphy, supra note 27; Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TEx. L. REv. 579
(1978); Perry, Book Review, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 685 (1978). Although it is possible
that we have ignored the relevance of history and original intent, see Monaghan, The
Constitution, supra note l, at 117, it seems that we have more often succumbed to the
error of ignoring Joseph Story's admonition that "Nothing but the text itself was
adopted by the people." 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 300 (4th ed. 1873).
46. See supra note 3.
47. R. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 133; Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56
N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1981).
48. J. H. ELY, supra note 1; Ely, The WagesofCrying Wo(fi A Comment on Roe
v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
49. "(T]he most important datum bearing on what was intended is the constitutional language itself." J.H. ELY, supra note l, at 16.
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tions are languages designed in part, like other languages, to
convey information. But the important feature of a bridge convention (or indeed the notion of bidding at all) is that the use of
conventions is derived from and directed towards one quite simple
fact-in the game of bridge, you are not permitted to look at your
partner's cards. If a player could look at his partner's hand before
arriving at the final contract, he could dispense with every convention yet devised.
Many people understand constitutional language in much the
same way as a bridge convention. Under the intentional paradigm, constitutional language exists only because we are unable to
know the specific intentions (the cards) of the drafters. If we
could ascertain that specific intention, or if we knew how the
drafters would treat the constitutional problems of the present, we
would have no need for constitutional language. To the extent
that we know that intention, then the importance of the text is
diminished pro tanto. so
This is not a useful model, for it fails to capture the sense in
which a text is authoritative as a text. No amount of looking into
the minds of the framers, or constructing fictionalized intentions
at various levels of abstraction, can render the text less authoritative. 51 The text is not only the starting point, but is also in some
special way the finishing point as well. Constitutional language
exists not only because the constitutional convention is not still
sitting, nor because James Madison and his colleagues were not
immortal. The text interposes itself between the intentions of the
framers and the problems of the present, cutting off the range of
permissible access and references to original intent, thereby reducing the extent to which original intent persists after the text's .
SO. This is implicit in any view that treats "unmistakable intention" as being
equivalent to text. See supra note 27. The difficult question occurs, however, when
the text and the legislative history are in some way inconsistent. On this point, the
canons of interpretation are not helpful, because one canon suggests that we look at
the legislative history only when the text is unclear, and another says that we can look
at legislative history to reject a textual statement inconsistent with that history. Compare Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,490 (1917), with United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1979). See generally, Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and
the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV.
892 (1982).
It is unfortunately common for commentators to contlate textual and historical
approaches to constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 42, at 8; Grey,
Unwrillen Constitution, supra note l, at 712-13; Perry, lnterpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 280-81 (1981). The two approaches are, however, fundamentally different. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, 58
TEX. L. REV. 695, 707 (1980). See also Alexander, supra note 2.
S l. J. STORY, supra note 45, at 300; Chafee, The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41
COLUM. L. REV. 381, 399-402 (1941); Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition,
82 YALE L.J. 227, 254 (1972). See also Chevigny, Pht1osophy of Language and Free
Expression, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 174 (1980).

810

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:797

adoption. A theory of constitutional language is incomplete if it
does not recognize the way in which a text is authoritative - the
way in which we treat the Constitution, but not, for example, the
Declaration of Independence or the Mayflower Compact, as law.
The authoritativeness of a text is by no means a peculiar feature of a written constitution. Although constitutional law is exciting and popular at the moment, we. should not forget our basic
law school contracts principles. One such basic principle requires
that the parties be held to the reasonable meaning of the terms
they have used, regardless of their subjective intent at the time
they used those words. 52 And. tpe considerations that led to acceptance of this "objective" theory of contracts 53 are the same as
those that generated other common law rules, for example the
"plain meaning" rule in the common law of defamation. 54
What the analogy with contract law shows us, however, is not
something about contracts, or even about law. The analogy illuminates, rather, something about language in general, of which
the language of a written constitution and the language of a contract are subsets. In order to make sense of language, we presume
52. "If, however, it were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he
used the words, intended something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes upon them, he would still be held, unless there were some mutual mistake, or
something else of the sort." Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of New York, 200 F.
287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (Hand, L., J.).
53. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 153 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1946)
(Frank, J., concurring). See also Mansfield v. Hodgdon, 147 Mass. 304, 17 N.E. 544
(1888); Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 127 Mo. App. 383, 105 S.W.
777 (1907); Smith v. Hughes, 6 Q.B. 597 (1871). See generally 1 A. CoRBIN, CoRBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 106 (1963); 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 539, at 82
(1963); L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 10 (2d ed. 1965).
Corbin maintains that it is an "illusion" that words have meaning independent of
those who use them. 1 A. CoRBIN, supra,§ 106, at 474. Were it not for that "illusion,"
however, we would have no way of understanding each other. This is the whole point
of any theory of meaning that stresses language as a rule-governed form of behavior.
See, e.g., ]. SEARLE, supra note 20, at 33-50; B. HARRISON, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 165-258 (1979).
Moreover, Corbin's eritique of a strictly objective view exposes an important ambiguity in our use of the term "objective," To the extent that "objective" suggests
certainty or precision, then Corbin's criticism is well taken. But if "objective" suggests only that we interpret on the basis of external factors, including the conventions
of language, but excluding the intentions of the language user, then a theory can be
objective without making any claim of precision or certainty. It is the latter sense of
· "objective" that is at the heart of the objective theory of eontracts and also at the
heart of the theory of constitutional interpretation suggested in this Essay.
54. See, e.g., Lorentz v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 155 F.2d 84, 87 (9th Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 727 (1946); Lyman v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co.,
286 Mass. 258, 260, 190 N.E. 542, 543 (1934); Roberts v. Camden, 103 Eng. Rep. 508,
509 (K.B. 1807). See generally W. ODGERS, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF LIBEL AND
SLANDER§ 93, at 144 (2d ed. 1887); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ Ill, at 747 (4th ed. 1971).
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that it represents the intentional acts of human beings. 55 But there
is a difference between the intention of a text and the human
thoughts that accompanied the creation of that text. Although the
authority of a text is derived in part from the intention that it be
authoritative, a text can have purpose without reference to the
psychological condition of its creator, as we see in the attempts of
courts to derive purpose from statutes themselves. 56 As one philosopher has put it, "[c]ommunication is a public, social affair and
[the communicator] is not exempted from responsibility for aspects of his performance he failed to notice." 57 Thus, "a speaker
is not the sole arbiter over what import his utterances have," 5 8 and
our touchstone must be the rules of language rather than largely
futile explorations into the mind of the communicator. So long as
the distinction between "what he said" and ''what he meant to
say" is meaningful, then we must recognize that the conventions
oflanguage use are superior, in the hierarchy of interpretive tools,
to the intentions of the speaker. This is even more true when the
language used has an authoritative embodiment, as in a statute or
in a written constitution.
The intentional paradigm implicitly confuses a language with
a code (as in "morse code" rather than in "Uniform Commercial
Code"). Codes, such as bridge conventions, are only one form of
language, 59 and it is wrong to assume that every language is a
code. In theory, codes are dispensable, as the bridge example
demonstrates, but language is not. Moreover, language operates
only because it has meaning, quite apart from what the speaker
may have meant to say. 60 Perhaps meaning is use, 61 but the inten55. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) l (1824), John Marshall noted that
those who ratified the Constitution "must be understood . . . to have intended what
they have said." /d. at 188.
56. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statures, 47 CoLUM. L.
REV. 527, 538-39 (1947). See generally P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 31-44 (1975).
57. P. JONES, PHILOSOPHY AND THE NoVEL 183-84 (1975). The dispute between
the "intentionalists" and the "anti-intentionalists" is prominent in contemporary philosophy of literary criticism. The dispute is described and fully documented in P.
JUHL, INTERPRETATION: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LITERARY CRITICISM
(1980). Juhl himself is an intentionalist. There is much in the corpus of writing about
literary interpretation that is of great importance to the constitutional theorist, both
for intentionalists and anti-intentionalists like. myself.
58. P. JONES, supra note 57, at 183-84. See also S. CAVELL, MusT WE MEAN
WHAT WE SAY? 32 (1969).
59. Perhaps the characteristic feature of a code is that it is perfectly translatable
into some language. Natural languages, however, arising in the context of particular
cultures, are not necessarily perfectly translatable into other natural languages. See
W. QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT (1960).
60. See generally P. JoNES, supra note 57, at 182-99; J. SEARLE, supra note 20; J.
SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS
(1979). For a more intention-oriented theory of meaning, see Grice, supra note 7, at
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tions of the user do not determine exclusively, or even mainly, the
use.
In arguing for greater attention to the Constitution as an authoritative text, I do not urge a literalist, conceptualist, or formalist approach to constitutional adjudication. 62 The view that the
text can be interpreted as self-defining, or as ordinary language, 63
or without reference to purpose64 does not follow from the proposition that the text is authoritative. In many instances, we can derive purpose from a text, 65 and we can apply canons of
interpretat~on peculiar to the nature of the Constitution itself.
Working out the details of such a program is difficult, but it is a
task that cannot be avoided if we are to develop a theory of constitutional interpretation that captures both the authoritativeness of
the text and the necessity of contextual interpretation.
Ill.

MORAL THEORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE

Many issues of constitutional interpretation concern the Constitution's incorporation or non-incorporation of moral values.
We must, then, examine the way in which the text either mandates, prohibits, or permits the use of certain moral arguments.
Thus, I will propose questions that are metaethical, but in a rather
special way. For, unlike most of the others who have asked
metaethical questions, 66 I will not ask how we reason about ethics,
but rather when and how much we reason about ethics-at least in
this constitutional law context.
377; Grice, Utterer's Meaning and Intentions, 78 PHIL. REv. 147 (1969). A more sophisticated version is found inS. ScHIFFER, MEANING (1972).
61. See supra note 7.
62. The term "literalism" is ambiguous, because it is unclear where the literal
meaning of the term at issue comes from. In one sense, every textually oriented theory, including this one, is a version of literalism. But we more commonly equate
literalism with the ordinary language definition of constitutional terms, or with the
notion that the text provides clear answers to all of our problems. In this sense, literalism shares both the characteristics and the flaws of what we usually refer to as
"formalism" or "conceptualism." See H.L.A. HART, supra note 6, at 126; J. STONE,
THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 149-65 (1946); Hart, supra note 6, at 270. On
the distinction between literalism and interpretivism, see Grey, supra note 50, at 703,
706 n.9.

63. In addition to the authorities cited supra note 63, see Stone, supra note 6, at
466, 472.
64. On purpose-oriented interpretation, see Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to
Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630 ( 1958). See also supra note
56 & accompanying text.
65. See P. JoNES, supra note 57, at 183-84, 194-95; Frankfurter, supra note 56.
66. Whether there is a distinction between ethics and metaethics (between substantive ethical principles and the methodology of ethical inquiry) is by no means
clear, because some metaethical views, particularly versions of relativism and subjectivism, may tend to collapse the distinction. But the distinction serves tolerably well
for my present purposes.
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At the conclusion of his essay on "Constitutional Cases," 67
Ronald Dworkin notes that the problem of rights against the state
"argues for a fusion of constitutional law and moral theory, a connection that, incredibly, has yet to take place." 68 This statement is
both revealing and ambiguous, for the key word "fusion" admits
of a number of importantly different interpretations. 69 Two items
may become fused in a strong sense when they are merged so that
the two are no longer separately identifiable; or they may become
fused in a weaker sense when, although tightly joined, we can continue to identify the originally separate components.
If we are to accept Dworkin's incredulity as justified, we must
determine how much moral theory is to be merged into constitutional law, where and how that merger is to take place, and how
much of the· resultant product will be fused in the strong sense. I
propose therefore to explore several "strategies of fusion," and
their presuppositions about the Constitution and moral theory.
A.

Moral Theory as Constitutional Command

In his essay "Cruel and Unusual Punishments," 70 Jeffrie
Murphy introduces his argument by saying that "if one can
mount a good argument that to treat a person in a certain way is
gravely unjust or would violate some basic human right of his, this
is also and necessarily a good argument that it is unconstitutional
to treat him in this way."71
The import of Murphy's characterization of constitutional argument is that if he is correct, then he has, in the same forty-six
words,just written the Constitution?! For if any good moral argument is eo ipso a good constitutional argument, the text becomes
superfluous. 72 But surely the text must serve some purpose other
than to offer a carte blanche for moral philosophizing. In fact, it
defines the contours of permissible moral arguments. The authori67. R. DwoRKIN, supra note ll, at 131-49.
68. Id. at 149.
69. I do not mean to take Dworkin to task for this one word. The rest of his
essay, as well as Dworkin's use of the word "connection" in the same sentence, cautions us against taking Dworkin's metaphor as an argument.
70. J. MURPHY, Cruel and Unusual Punishments, in RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND
THERAPY 223-49 (1979).
71. Id. at 223.
72. The quoted sentence is hardly crucial to Murphy's fine analysis of the problem of punishment, and in that sense I suppose I am being unfair. But the sentence is
there, and it provides a concise statement of a position that has at times surfaced in
constitutional theory. See, e.g., Thomas Grey's description of a now "moribund" first
form of non-interpretivist review in Grey, Origins, supra note l, at 844 n.8 (1978).
For a powerful critique of theories that strive for congruence between constitutional .
law and "correct" moral theory, see Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 353 (1981).
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tative nature of the text, and the existence of a substantive content
beyond a mere formal authorization73 for judges to philosophize,
compels us to reject Murphy's notion of one-to-one fusion of constitutional law and moral theory. In addition, we can find
counterexamples to Murphy's theory; there are moral arguments
that appear good yet irrelevant to the Constitution (for example,
rights to safety in the workplace). Conversely, there are constitutional issues, even in the Bill of Rights, that are only dimly illuminated by moral argument (for example, the right to trial by jury in
civil cases, 74 and the right to keep and bear arms).
Murphy's statement erroneously suggests a model of constitutional law and moral theory as congruent circles. The more apt
geometric metaphor is that of intersecting circles, which leaves
areas of both constitutionally irrelevant moral argument and morally sterile constitutional argument. Viewed in this way, a good
moral argument is no longer "necessarily" a good constitutional
argument. That one has a moral duty to support one's parents in
their dotage is fairly clear, but the Constitution does not deal with
this duty, nor does it require that it be enforced or supplemented
by the state. Conversely, a good constitutional argument is not
necessarily a good moral argument, as for example the argument
one would deploy in challenging the constitutional qualifications
· of an able and mature thirty-three year old to hold office as President of the United States. A good moral argument is therefore a
good constitutional argument only if it falls within that area of
uioral theory embraced by the Constitution as relevant. The crucial task remains, then, to define the contours of this area, and to
determine the manner in which the constitutional text identifies
constitutionally relevant moral theory.

B. The General/Particular Theory
A more plausible theory than an interpretation that takes the
moral or political flavor of the Constitution as a mandate for rendering the text irrelevant is the "general/particular" theory of textual interpretation. This theory, which appears in various forms,
takes the morally or politically oriented constitutional provi73. Without getting too deeply into the issue ofthe meaning and scope of judicial
discretion here, I use formal authorization to refer to a norm that grants authority
without specifying the substantive standards or constraints for the exercise of that
authority. See Paulson, Material and Formal Authorisation in Kelsen's Pure Theory, 39
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 172 (1980).
74. U.S. CoNST. amend. VII. My unargued assumption that this provision has
little moral content derives some support from the fact that it remains one of the few
provisions of the Bill of Rights that has not been incorporated by the fourteenth
amendment. See Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. La.), '!ff'd sub
nom. Hill v. McKeithen, 409 U.S. 943 (1972).
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sions-for example, freedom of speech, equal protection of the
laws, and freedom of religion-not as discrete repositories of selfcontained moral or political theories, but rather as instances, or
more particularized expressions of the single moral or political
theory embedded in the Constitution. The theory, as most commonly expressed, does not merely say that instantiated constitutional values are derived from higher and more general principles.
It says that they are derived from one higher and more general
principle. This theory is implicit in the work of theorists as diverse as David Richards 75 and John Hart Ely, 76 and is suggested
in some parts of Ronald Dworkin's writings. 77 Its proponents
view the text as the raw material from which to construct a general
moral or political theory of the Constitution. Because the generated theory must encompass the more particularized values explicitly stated in the text, it is not totally unbounded, but can claim
a mandate from the text itself.
The general/particular theory (or meta theory) is attractive
because it evolves out of the text, while, at the same time, it is not
constrained by the more uncomfortable moral or political gaps 7s
75. See, e.g., D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 51·54 (1977); Rich·
ards, Constitutional Privacy, The Right to Die and the Meaning ofLife: A Moral Ana/y·
sis, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 327 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Richards, Constitutional
Privacy]; Richards, supra note 1; Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional
Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1979); Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right to
Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1281 (1977). For Richards, "the
concept of human rights" is his "unwritten constitution," Richards, supra note 1, at
300-01, and it is this concept that he proceeds to use for the decision of particular
cases. Richards acknowledges that there may be different conceptions of that concept,
but that is not inconsistent with the theory that there is, for a particular analyst at a
particular time, one unitary constitutional theory, and that is the methodology with
which I take issue.
76. J.H. ELY, supra note 1. I have heard Professor Ely's theory of the Constitu·
tion described as "one big equal protection clause." His theory is far richer and more
complex than that, but it is still one theory. For a quite different critique of unitary
cons.titutional theories, including Ely's, see Gerety, Book Review, 42 U. PITT. L. REv.
35 (1980).
77. Dworkin's general theory of adjudication is similarly both unitary and recon·
structive in that he would have judges construct the unifying theory that provides "the
best justification ... for the body of propositions of law already shown to be true
. . ." Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: EssAYS IN
HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 58, 82 (P. Hacker & J. Raz eds. 1977). See also R. DWOR·
KIN, supra note 11, at 81-130. Dworkin, however, explicitly recognizes the underdetermination problem discussed in the text. ld at 64-68. See Alexander &
Bayles, Hercules or Proteus? The Many Theses ofRonald Dworkin, 5 Soc. THEORY &
PRAC. 267 (1980). It is questionable whether Dworkin's solution is really a solution.
ld. In any event, there is much in his theory that would provide support for any
particularI general theorist.
78. The right to privacy, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and
the right to travel, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), are perhaps the
most prominent of these gaps.
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in the Constitution. Thus, if we use the mentioned particulars as
the building blocks for a theory, and then apply that general theory directly to future cases, we can easily find a particular right to
privacy,79 a particular right to travel,8° and so on, as well as even
more particular rights derived from these rights. 81 So long as
these rights are part of the general theory constructed from the
mentioned particulars and are not inconsistent with the text, the
absence of these particular rights in the text does not undermine
their existence and application. The text operates somewhat like a
ladder. 82 We use it to build the theory, or perhaps to reconstruct
the theory that was implicit all along. Having built the theory, we
can kick away the ladder and then apply the theory directly.
This methodology appeals to us because it captures, at a
rather high level of abstraction, the intuitive feeling that the
Constitution is incomplete. It also reflects the sense in which not
only particular applications but also more general principles must
change to accommodate changing circumstances. 83 Moreover, it
justifies a wide range of morally or politically attractive results
without totally rejecting the importance of the text. 84 Indeed, this
methodology would be ideal but for the fact that it rests on two
mistakes and one controversial assumption.
First, any general/particular theory mistakenly assumes that
one general principle (or theory) can be uniquely, or at least most
correctly, derived from a set of particulars, or instances. This assumption, however, ignores the extent to which any theory-scientific, moral, or interpretive-is underdetermined by any number
of specific instances or observations. 85 Theory is underdetermined
79. The methodology under discussion here was most notable in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In that case, the Court used specific particulars,
embodied in the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments, to construct a right to privacy and then applied that constructed right to the issue (contraception) at hand. See
D. RICHARDS, supra note 75, at 81-109.
80. See]. H. ELY, supra note I, at 177-79.
81. Thus, Richards talks about various specific rights being generated by the
right of privaey. See, e.g., Richards, Constitutional Privacy, supra note 75.
82. See L. WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS (D. Pears & B.
McGuinness trans. 1961). I do not claim to be using Wittgenstein's ladder metaphor
for the same purpose for which he used it.
83. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 63 (1962);·A. BICKEL, THE
MORALITY OF CONSENT 25-30 (1975); Munzer & Nickel, supra note 2; Richards,
supra note I.
84. Griswold did not generate nearly the avalanche of scholarly criticism that befell Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See, e.g., ]. H. ELY, supra note 48, at 15, 66;
Epstein, Substantive .Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SuP.
CT. REv. 159. Part of the explanation might be that the statute at issue in Griswold
was substantially more ridiculous than that in Roe. The more likely explanation,
however, is that the reliance on specific textual provisions, rather than on general
liberty/due process considerations, made Griswold seem more palatable.
85 .. The loci classici for the underdetermination thesis are P. DUHEM, THE AIM

1982]

CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE

817

in this sense because any number of empirical observations, or
specific instances, can generate and be consistent with a large and
perhaps infinite number of explanatory theories. Moreover, each
such explanatory theory will yield different predictions or results
for future cases. 86 For example, a given set of symptoms can be
consistent with a number of different medical diagnoses, and to
that extent the diagnosis is underdetermined by the observation of
symptoms. Similarly, several different theories about the formation of the solar system might be equally consistent with our observations about the solar system. The principle of
underdetermination of theory applies to a wide range of activities,
and it has been frequently discussed in reference to the philosophy
of science, 87 to literary criticism, 88 to historical explanation, 8 9 and
so forth. In each of these disciplines, theory acquires a different
role, but the point remains the same: specific examples, instances,
observations, or events can produce more than one theory equally
consistent with those examples, instances, observations, or events.
We see the same phenomenon in constitutional theorizing because a large number of different overarching theories would be
consistent with the specific moral or political principles specified
in the text. We may have good reasons to choose one theory
rather than another, just as a doctor may have good reasons to
choose one medical diagnosis over another that is equally consistent with the same symptoms. But the constitutional text does not
determine the choice among theories equally consistent with it,
and thus the argument that the theory is generated by the Constitution is seen to be a fake. Certainly we can require that the particular theory fit all of the textualized particulars as a necessary
condition of its validity. But if this is taken to be a sufficient conAND STRUCTURE OF PHYSICAL THEORY (P. Wiener trans. 1954); W. QUINE, FROM A
LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW (2d ed. 1961); W. QUINE, supra note 59.
86. One practical, rather than strictly logical, objection to the underdetermination thesis is that a large enough number of observations will cause "convergence"
towards only one theory. See M. HESSE, REVOLUTIONS AND RECONSTRUCTIONS IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE at viii (1980). This seems to be the point implicit in
Dworkin's references to "density." Dworkin, supra note 77, at 83-84. Apart from the
fact that the convergence thesis itself has some logical difficulties, M. HESSE, supra, at
viii-x, it seems plain to me that the constitutional/ext is hardly dense enough to rebut
the problem of underdetermination in reference to constructing a theory from the
text.
87. See, e.g., C. GLYMOUR, THEORY AND EVIDENCE (1980); M. HESSE, supra
note 86; M. HESSE, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE (1974); T. KUHN,
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
88. See Rader, Fact, Theory, and Literary Explanation, 1 CRITICAL INQUIRY 245
(1974).
89. See generally R. ATKINSON, KNOWLEDGE AND EXPLANATION IN HISTORY
(1978); R. MARTIN, HISTORICAL EXPLANATION: RE-ENACTMENT AND PRACTICAL INFERENCE (1977).
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dition, then there is little limit on the extent to which quite different theories can find their source in the Constitution. If that is so,
the text does not control the result in future cases and does not
affect our decision of which competing coherent theory to accept.
This does not mean that judges should be forbidden to construct
moral or political theories, 90 but it does defeat the claim that the
theory so constructed is either mandated by or derived from the
text.
A general/particular theory makes its second mistake by
presuming that the selection of particulars from which to construct
or reconstruct the general theory is itself independent of theory.
The process of selecting particulars is not and cannot be valueneutral.91 Textually explicit particulars are analagous to observations from which we construct a theory, and we cannot lightly ignore the extent to which such observations are controlled by
theory. 92 The instances are not just there waiting for us to build a
theory around them. We have to select the particulars to use, and
this selection process contains implicit judgments of value and
importance.
Interestingly, in this connection, most people who seek to
build unitary moral or political theories of constitutional rights
select (i.e., observe) the same constitutional provisions-the first
amendment, the due process clause, the equal protection clause,
the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, the amendments extending the franchise, and so on. They thus impose a
theory_ on the Constitution more than they extract one from it. 93 If
the process of selection concentrates on different provisions, a different theory results. For example, John Hart Ely, 94 who concen90. Even though the actual theory constructed will not, in my view, be textually
mandated, the process of theory construction still aids in assuring principled adjudication. Thus, theory construction serves methodological goals of the legal system that
are independent of the substance of the theory. See Golding, Principled DecisionMaking and the Supreme Court, 63 CoLUM. L. REV. 35 (1963); Greenawalt, The Enduring Sign(ficance of Neutral Principles, 18 CoLUM. L. REV. 982 (1978).
91. In this sense, "values" incorporates not only particular views about particular
subjects, but also the experiences and training of the selector. Imagine an automobile
accident observed by a surgeon, a tort lawyer, and an automotive engineer. If we
asked each of them the question "What happened?," we would get fundamentally
different answers which varied in the particular facts reported and the language used
to describe the reported facts.
92. See generally P. ACHINSTEIN, CONCEPTS OF SCIENCE: A PHILOSOPHICAL
ANALYSIS (1968); M. HESSE, supra note 86; K. POPPER, UNENDED QUEST 52 (1976)
('There is ~? such thing as a perception except in the context of interests and expectatiOns . . . . ).
93. The story of the blind men and the elephant suggests just how easy it is to
generalize on the basis of preselected and incomplete versions of the evidence. Saxe,
The Blind Men and the Elephant: A Hlndoo Fable, in STORY POEMS 267 (L. Untcrmeyer rev. ed. 1961).
94. J. H. ELY, supra note 1, at IJ7-l0l.
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trates on the majoritarian provisions of the Constitution, derives a
theory quite unlike the theories derived by Dworkin and Richards, who concentrate on individual rights and anti-majoritarian
aspects of the Constitution. 95 And imagine the theory we might
derive if we concentrated on the property-protecting provisions of
the Constitution, 96 perhaps including the second amendment as
well?! Our selection depends on what we think is most important,
and what we think is most important is pre-textual. Although
some of these theories might be better than others, any theory
based on something less than all of the constitutional text is selective,97 and the process of selection is hardly value-neutral. We see
what we want to see and ignore what we want to ignore, and theories that purport to "explain" the Constitution usually explain
only those portions of the Constitution that the theorist finds, for
non-textually based reasons, to be most significant.
The controversial assumption contained in any particular/general theory is that the morally or politically loaded clauses
of the Constitution are particulars instead of more general irreducible principles, and also that they are particulars of the same
general principle. 98 Some constitutional provisions, of course, are
derived from higher principles. For example, the first amendment's protection of freedom of speech might be plausibly derived
from the political principle of popular sovereignty,99 and the
equal protection clause is plausibly derived from some sort of
"golden rule" or universalization principle. 100 But in order to
construct a theory of the Constitution, we must assume that all of
the textual provisions are reducible to one overarching principle.
Thus, the methodology of a particular/general theory presupposes
a unitary moral or political theory (albeit perhaps a highly complex one 101 ) that explains and unites all but the purely structural
constitutional provisions.
95. See R. DwoRKIN, supra note 11; D. RICHARDS, supra note 75.
96. Art. 1, § 10; amend. III; amend. IV; amend. V; amend. XIV.
97. Even if all of the text is used, the weighting is selective. It is a mistake to
assume that even "equal" weighting would be value-neutral, because the notion of
equality is dependent upon the context. How would we react to a constitutional law
casebook that devoted as much space to the third and twenty-third amendments as it
did to the first and fourteenth?
98. See supra notes 75-76. For Professor Dworkin the principle is that of "equal
concern and respect." Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC & PRIVATE MORALITY 113, 126
(S. Hampshire ed. 1978).
99. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 42.
100. On universalization, compare R. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON 7-50 (1963)
to Schwartz, Against Universality, 78 J. PHIL. 127 (1981).
101. There are, in fact, two ·kinds of unitary theories. One kind involves only one
ultimate principle, such as Dworkin's principle of "equal concern and respect." See
supra note 98. Other theories have two or more principles, but incorporate theories
that relate those principles to each other in a priority relationship. See, e.g., J. RAwLs,
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In order to evaluate this presupposition, we must question
whether such an overarching theory can conceivably exist. If we
follow Rawls, 102 Richards, 103 Dworkin, 104 Gewirth, 105 and others
in believing that such a theory exists or can be constructed, then
the search for a unifying theory of constitutional morality is highly plausible. But if one accepts ethical pluralism 106 as a more accurate reflection of reality, then freedom of speech, fair procedure,
equality, and so on may be ultimate and irreducible primary values with no necessarily coherent relationship. 107 If this is true,
then we need not tie these values together nor fill the gaps between
them. If there is a plurality of first principles, then that, of course,
means that in some cases they will conflict. 108 The pluralist would
not wish to deny this, but would deny the existence of any conflict-resolving higher theory. 109 This makes constitutional intepretation more difficult than it would be under a single unifying
principle, but one cannot validly move from "it would be nice if it
did" to "therefore it must," despite the prevalence of this move in
many arguments for non-pluralist ethical theories. 110
A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). The distinction is therefore best expressed in terms of
the complexity of the single ultimate principle.
102. Id at 34-53.
103. D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION (1971).
104. Dworkin, supra note 98.
105. A. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978) ("Principle of Generic
Consistency").
106. Perhaps the foremost pluralist of modem times is Isaiah Berlin. Berlin's most
important works are collected in I. BERLIN, AGAINST THE CuRRENT: ESSAYS IN THE
HISTORY OF IDEAS (H. Hardy ed. 1980); I. BERLIN, CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES:
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS (H. Hardy ed. 1979); I. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY
(1969); I. BERLIN, RUSSIAN THINKERS (H. Hardy & A. Kelly eds. 1978). See also B.
WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 166-86 (1973); Feinberg, Rawls and Intuitionism,
in READING RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES ON RAWLS' A Theory ofJustice 108 (N. Daniels ed. 1975); Williams, Conflicts of Values, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF ISAIAH BERLIN 221 (A. Ryan ed. 1979). See generally B. BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT (1965); R. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY (1959); H.L.A. HART, PuNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).
107. The relation of coherence is stronger than the relation of consistency. Two
propositions, such as "It is snowing today" and "Napoleon lost at Waterloo" may be
consistent with each other, although not possessing the relation of mutual entailment
implicit in the idea of coherence. See generally A. WOOZLEY, THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 129-75 (1949). A claim of coherence in any normative philosophy-moral,
political, or legal-is a claim that in some way all of the norms of the system "fit
together." Thus, coherence requires consistency, but the reverse is not true. I am now
in the process of developing a fuller analysis and explication of the notion of coherence in the philosophy of law, and my remarks here are a specific and tentative embodiment of this larger project.
108. J. RAWLS, supra note 101, at 34-40.
109. ld See a/so B. BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE 5-6 (1973).
110. Rawls, concedes, however, that the desirability of having conflict-resolving
higher principles is not eo ipso evidence of their existence. J. RAwLS, supra note 101,
at 39.

1982]

CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE

821

I do not wish here to join further the debate between the pluralists (Rawls' "intuitionists" 111 ) and the coherence theorists. 112
But that dispute exists, and we must recognize that the argued
mandate for constructing unitary moral theories around or
through the Constitution derives from only one side of a highly
contested deontological debate. Moreover, this one-sided view
presupposes not only that ethical pluralism is wrong, but it must
presuppose as well that pluralism is totally implausible despite the
structure of the constitutional text which suggests plurality rather
than unity. The arrangement of the text, with particular and discrete provisions and with no expressed unifying principle save a
vacuous Preamble, 113 appears to be the embodiment of pluralistic
ethics. Thus, the task of the constitutional coherence theorist is
not only to show that ethical pluralism is wrong, but also to refute
the appearance of ethical pluralism in the text of the Constitution.
IV.

LANGUAGE AND THEORY

In a much more promising start toward constructing a theory
of constitutional language, Ronald Dworkin distinguishes "concepts" and "conceptions." 114 His theory is incomplete, but its gaps
can direct us toward a more satisfactory formulation.
Despite its similarity to ordinary language associations,
Dworkin's distinction between concepts and conceptions does not
parallel the distinction between connotation and denotation, or
between intension and extension. Rather, his distinction admits
the existence of, and is derived from, differences in meaning
rather than various applications of an agreed meaning. 115 A conIll. Because "intuitionism" has been used to refer to a method of identifying
moral values rather than the relation among them (and in this sense Rawls, Richards,
Dworkin, and Gewirth may all be intuitionists), Rawls' terminology is a trifle misleading. It has been suggested that "pluralism" would be a better appellation, as a
plurality of values is used. B. BARRY, supra note 109, at 6.
112. I use "coherence theorist" to refer to anyone who holds that there is one
ultimate system of moral values, whether they be monists like Dworkin or priorityranked pluralists like Rawls. See supra note 101.
113. See Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 371 (1981).
114. R. DwoRKIN, supra note II, at 134-37; Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56
N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1981). See also J. RAWLS, supra note 101, at 10. For commentary on the distinction, see Munzer & Nickel, supra note 2, at 1037-41; Saphire, Professor Richards' Unwril/en Constitution of Human Rights: Some Preliminary
Observations, 4 U. DAYTON L. REV. 305 (1979). See also D. RICHARDS, supra note
75, at 44-56.
115. This is so, except to the extent that changes in meaning (different conceptions) are built into what Dworkin means by a concept. R. DwoRKIN, supra note II,
at 103, 134-37. In this sense, the meaning of a concept never changes, but this is only
because in another sense the concept itself has no meaning apart from some conception of it. The real problem is that there is an inevitable tension between open poncepts and most traditional theories of meaning. See generally M. WEITZ, THE
OPENING MIND 25-48 (1977).
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ception in Dworkin's scheme is a particular (but not necessarily
particularized, in the sense of highly detailed) theory which is
thought to explain the meaning of a concept. 1 16 A concept, therefore, allows competing theories of its meaning, and no one of
these theories is necessarily more or less correct as a definition or
explanation of the concept. 117 A concept is something 1 18 whose
definition requires references to a theory, but no theory provides a
uniquely correct definition. If only one plausible theory existed,
then that theory would provide the definition of the concept, and
there would be no need for the distinction between concept and
conception. In order for the distinction to survive, then, there
must be at least two competing conceptions (theories), neither of
which is demonstrably better or more correct than the other as a
definition of the concept.
This distinction seems to hold great potential for a theory of
constitutional interpretation, because, as Dworkin maintains, it
enables us to argue alternative conceptions within the framework
of the existing concepts set forth in the constitutional text. But the
utility Of the distinction rests on the exact nature of a "concept."
In order for any word, including a concept, to have a potential
use, it must have some meaning which allows us to understand its
use in the face of competing theoretical conceptions. One candidate for "some meaning" is the existence of a paradigm, or exemplar. W.B. Gallie contrasted "essentially contested concepts" 1 19
(the notion from which Dworkin derives his distinction 120) with
those words whose use was merely "radically confused." 121 For
Gallie, the existence of an exemplar makes it possible to meaningfully use words whose essential characteristics are contested. 122
Gallie offers the concept of a "champion" to demonstrate the
116. R. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 103, 134-37.
117. Id.
118. I use the word "something" deliberately, because there is a long tradition of
philosophical debate about just what concepts are, some claiming they are words of a
particular sort, some claiming they are mental images, and so on. See generally M.
WEITZ, supra note 115, at 3-24; N. CAMPBELL, FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE 45 (1957).
119. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc. 167
(1955). See also W.B. GALLIE, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING
(1964). For commentary, see Kekes, Essentially Contested Concepts: A Reconsideration, 10 PHIL. & RHETORIC 71 (1977); Garver, Rhetoric and Essentially Contested Arguments, 11 PHIL. & RHETORIC 156 (1978). See also Booth, "Preserving the
Exemplar" or, How Not to .Dig Our Own Graves, 3 J. CRITICAL INQUIRY 407 (1977);
Mcintyre, The Essential Contestahility of Some Social Concepts, 84 ETHICS 1 (1973).
Also useful is C. STEVENSON, Persuasive .Definitions, in FACTS AND VALUES 32 (1963).
120. R. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 103.
121. Gallie, supra note 119, at 178-79.
122. See id. at 176-86. Munzer and Nickel are cautious about taking up the question .of the ultimate validity of the concept/conception distinction and presumably are
equally cautious about Gallic's original notion of essentially contested concepts.
Munzer & Nickel, supra note 2, at 1039 n.46.

1982]

CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE

823

operation of an exemplar. 123 Modifying this example, we might
contend that the New York Yankees of 1927 were the exemplar of
a "great" baseball team. If, in this context, "great baseball team"
marks an essentially contested concept, we nonetheless under~
stand the use of the concept because we recognize the authority
and unattainable standards 124 of the exemplar. Thus, if one base~
ball team's hitting and depth were stronger than that of the 1927
Yankees, but its pitching was weaker, and if another team's pitch~
ing and depth were stronger but its hitting was weaker, we could
contest whether either or both of these teams were entitled to the
"great baseball team" designation. Although the concept is con~
tested, it retains meaning through a core of settled meaning, the
exemplar, which allows us to debate about the shape and extent of
the fringe.
A more plausible candidate than the "exemplar," for "some
meaning" that makes understanding of a contested concept possible, could be a "family resemblance." 125 Unlike the unattainable
standards of the exemplar, the family resemblance has no set of
necessary and sufficient defining characteristics, 126 but rather is an
interlocking relationship among the appropriate uses of a term.
Although the Wittgensteinian "family resemblance" does not admit of a core and fringe characterization, 127 it still contains exemplars. While we might debate whether some novel form of
amusement is "really" a game, we have no doubt that Olympic
games and party games are games, despite the absence of identifiable shared features. Without the existence of exemplars of some
kind, we have not a contested concept, and perhaps not even Gallie's "radically confused" concept, but perhaps just loose talk, or,
even worse, vacuous talk.
If this is so, then Dworkin's concepts have run into heavy
weather. Almost certainly exemplars for freedom of speech, equal
protection, and many other similar constitutional concepts have
123. Gallie, supra note 119, at 176-79.
124. The standard of being unattainable is important, although neglected by Gallie, for if the exemplar were attainable there would be little to contest. The question
would only be whether one had attained identity in all respects with the exemplar, in
which case the concept would apply-or had not, in which case the concept would not
apply. But if the exemplar is unattainable, then we can argue about which features
are necessary in order for the concept to apply.
125. L. WilTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL lNVESTIGATIONS §§ 65-72 (3d ed. G. Anscombe trans. 1958). Wittgenstein's famous example is that of games. /d. at § 66.
126. /d.
127. See G. PITCHER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF WITTGENSTEIN 215-27 (1964); Chandler, Three Types of Classes, 3 AM. PHIL. Q. 77 (1966). Hart has claimed that all legal
terms could fit into the core and fringe characterization. Hart, Scandinavian Realism,
1959 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 233, 239-40. This seems mistaken, however, because it ignores
the existence of terms, sueh as family-resemblance terms, that do not have a single
core.
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never existed. There are exemplars for some, and Dworkin prop:erly points out that an exemplar exists for cruel and unusual punishment. 128 But surely no exemplar for "the freedom of speech"
shares the common agreement implicit in Gallie's original formulation of the essentially contested concept. Is imprisonment of a
newspaper editor for publishing criticism of the government the
exemplar of a free speech violation? It is not if we understand an
aversion to prior restraint to be the essential feature of the meaning of the "freedom of speech," 129 or if we take individual selfexpression through communication as the paradigm. 130 The identification of an exemplar in the absence of general agreement is
dependent upon a particular theory. In the absence of an exemplar, however, it is difficult to see how a particular theory or conception is or is not related to the concept at hand.
From this perspective, constitutional adjudication builds exemplars. But we encounter difficulty in locating the foundation
on which to build the exemplar or theory. Though the words of
the Constitution are the starting point, they give us very little
guidance.
Perhaps we should forget about concepts and conceptions,
and look instead at words, but words of a certain sort. Here, we
encounter a particular variety of words that cannot be understood
without reference to a theory. 131 Not all words share this characteristic equally, but some words or terms, such as "anal-retentive
personality" or "kinetic energy" or "wave function," 132 can only
be understood with reference to a theory. When we use terms
such as these, we presuppose the existence of some theory, even
though we do not explain the theory every time we use the terms.
If theory-laden words can appear in non-legal texts, then similar
terms ought to be able to appear in legal texts, and it seems promising to look at terms such as "the freedom of speech" and "equal
protection of the laws" as such theory-laden words, except that
128. R. DwoRKIN, supra note II, at 136 n.l.
129. See supra note 30.
130. See, e.g., Baker, Scope ofthe First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA
L. REv. 964 (1978). The focus is similar in Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law:
Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1974).
131. Most of the existing literature is in the philosophy of science, although the
point has much more universal application. See generally P. AcHJNSTEIN, CoNCEPTS
OF SCIENCE 157-201 (1968); N. HANSON, PATTERNS OF DISCOVERY (1958); C.
HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SciENCE 75 (1966); G. RYLE, DILEMMAS 90-91
(1956). Philosophers of science refer to theory-ladenness in reference both to terms of
this type and to observation, see supra note 91 & accompanying text, but it is important to keep the two ideas distinct.
·
132. For a discussion of the theories to which these terms refer, see generally P.
ACHJNSTEIN, supra note 131, at 180-83; N. HANSON, supra note 131, at 60.
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here the use of the term precedes the development of the theory,
rather than following after it.
If the use of the terms precedes the development of the theory, the terms themselves may have no meaning other than some
ordinary language associations and some syntactic meaning.
Notwithstanding this fact, they are still in a text which we take to
be authoritative. Their irremovable presence in the text must then
be taken as a mandate for the development of a theory that will
give content to the terms used. Significantly, the mandate does not
derive from the personal intentions or states of the mind of the
drafters of the document. It derives from the conventions that
govern language use, conventions that operate without regard to
the intentions of the user. 133 We argue unnecessarily and misleadingly when we argue that the use of such terms provides evidence
of an original intent by the framers that the underlying theories be
developed and changed, an intent we can assume from the failure
to use more specific terminology. 134 The constructed intent here is
unnecessary, because the rules and conventions oflanguage cut off
the necessity and possibly even the permissibility of looking behind them into the mind of the speaker or writer.
Philosophers commonly argue that if a speaker says p, and p
logically entails q, then the speaker is committed to q even if he
had never thought of q and never would have intended to say q. 13 5
A similar convention of language use appears applicable to the
use of theory-laden terms. When a speaker uses a theory-laden
term, the speaker is committed to the theory that may at any time
surround the use of the term, even if the speaker did not intend
that result. If, for example, I accuse someone of having an analretentive personality, my use of that term commits me to accusing
him of having whatever an anal-retentive personality entails as a
matter of psychiatric theory. And if I use terms such as "equal
protection of the laws," that too commits me to having authorized
the incorporation (and, if necessary, the creation) of a theory without which the term's meaning is incomplete.
Given that theories change, we can legitimately commit the
user of theory-laden terminology to the possibility of change implicit in any theory. Thus, the users of theory-laden language
such as "the freedom of speech" and "privileges and immunities
133. See supra notes 27-65 & accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 46-49 & accompanying text.
135. P. JoNES, supra note 57, at 182. See also S. BARKER, THE ELEMENTS OF
LoGIC 7 (3d ed. 1980). The notion of commitment in this sense is central in the
writings of John Searle. See J. SEARLE, supra note 20. For an interesting application,
see Finnis, Scepticism, Se!f-Refutation, and the Good o/ Truth, in LAW, MORALITY,
AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 247 (P. Hacker & J. Raz eds.
1977).
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of citizens of the United States" are committed to the theory
whose construction they have authorized by their choice of words.
Whether or not the user of those terms intended to be so committed does not matter. It's just part ofthe rules ofthe game. Theoryladen terms are incomplete, and the use of an incomplete term
commits the user to the fact that the completion is going to come
from somewhere else. The interpreter of the Constitution is thus,
in some sense, like a musician working with a score that is not
complete until it is interpreted; and in some sense like a trial lawyer who is expected to make the best case possible with the available evidence. An interpretation becomes an explication rather
than an explanation, 136 and we can hope for no more.
Additionally, we can argue that all of ordinary language is
theory-laden, 137 and indeed this is the assumption of much of
Western metaphysics, embodied, for example, in the categories of
Aristotle 138 and Kant.t3 9 But even if not all of ordinary language
is theory-laden, it is fairly uncontroversial that at least much of it
is. In some sense, the word "lunch" is theory-laden, at least as
compared to "eating" or "placing organic matter in one's mouth
for the purpose of introducing it into the digestive system." So,
too, are terms like "time," "space," "hailing" a cab, "playing" a
game, "sending" a letter, and "understanding" a book. We constantly use expressions which presuppose or incorporate theories
that do more than identify a physical object or activity.
Thus, when we say that a term is theory-laden, we presuppose
a particular point of view of the speaker with respect to which a
term is theory-laden. I cannot explain to a person ignorant of
baseball what a "home run" is without explaining a great deal of
baseball, but it seems strange to describe "home run" as theoryladen when one baseball player is talking to another. Similarly, I
cannot explain a "trick" to a non-bridge player without explaining
at least the rudiments of the game of bridge, even though "trick"
136. "Explication, when. not simply a synonym for 'explanation,' is the process
whereby a hitherto imprecise notion is given a formal definition, and so made suitable
for usc in formal work. The definition does not claim to be synonymous with the
original notion, since it is avowedly making it more precise." A. LACEY, A DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 66 (1976). The idea of explication is usually attributed to
Camap. R. CARNAP, MEANING AND NECESSITY 7-8 (2d ed. 1956). See also W.
QUINE, supra note 59, at 258-59. I am using "explication" in a slightly looser sense.
We explicate when we work out a theory, and when we explicate we put something in,
rather than just pulling something out.
137. See Hesse, Theory and Value in the Social Sciences, in AcTION AND INTERPRETATION I, 1-2 (C. Hookway & P. Pettit eds. 1978). See also P. FEYERABEND,
AGAINST METHOD 66 (1975). Whether there is or can be a value-free or theory-free
observation language has been one of the perennial problems in the philosophy of
science.
138. See 0. ANSCOMBE & P. 0EACH, THREE PHILOSOPHERS 5-63 (1961).
139. See J. HosPERS, supra note 33, at 184-86.
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is not highly theory-laden in conversations between bridge players. But suppose that after a sequence of bidding I explain to my
opponents at the bridge table that a particular bid was an "impossible negative." I must then explain a bidding system or theory
known as "Precision," without which the term "impossible negative" cannot be understood.
We can clarify things by distinguishing between two forms of
theory-ladenness. In the weaker sense, many of the terms of ordinary language are theory-laden. But in a stronger sense, terms are
only theory-laden if they force us to go outside the domain of discourse in which they are used. Thus, "lunch" and "time" are theory-laden in the weaker sense but not in the stronger, because the
theory that they presuppose is as much a part of ordinary language as is the language itself. But "straight flush" or "anal-retentive personality" or "habeas corpus," if used in ordinary
conversation, are theory-laden in the stronger sense because they
presuppose theories outside the domain of ordinary discourse. 140
Therefore, we can say that terms are theory-laden in a strong
sense only when they require us to go outside the context in which
we are speaking. And that is why "habeas corpus" may be theoryladen in ordinary language but not in law, as is even more true for
terms like "pleading," "statute of limitations," or "appeal."
This distinction applies directly to constitutional language.
The requirement that the President shall have attained "the Age
of thirty-five years" is theory-laden in the weak sense because it
presupposes a theory of determining age. It also presupposes the
deeper idea of determining growth with reference to chronology.
But it is not theory-laden in the strong sense because it is uncontroversially known to all participants speaking within the domain.
A reference in the Constitution to "habeas corpus," or "Congress," or "amendment" is similar. But a term in the Constitution
is 'theory-laden in the strong sense when it sends us outside the
legal domain. "Freedom of speech" and "equal protection of the
laws" are different from "habeas corpus" or "Congress," because
they send us outside of the legal domain and into the moral or the
political. That is also why the use of terminology that lacks meaning within the domain in which it is used can be said to commit
140. "(O]ne must always specify the theory with respect to which a given term is or
is not 'theory-laden."' P. AcHINSTEIN, supra note 131, at 183. Although we often
talk, especially in the context of constitutional theory, about vague or general terms, it
is important to remember that vagueness is relative as well, and the degree of vagueness will depend on the particular context in which a term is used and the particular
purposes for which it would or would not be vague. See I. ScHEFFLER, BEYOND THE
LETTER: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO AMBIGUITY, VAGUENESS AND METAPHOR
IN LANGUAGE 49-50 (1979).
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the user to whatever meaning may appear in or be provided by
another domain.
V.

LANGUAGE AS A CONSTRAINT

Characterizing constitutional terms as theory-laden is problematic because the language then provides little if any guidance
in our search for theory. Perhaps, therefore, a theory-authorizing
view of constitutional language gives no weight to the text of the
Constitution. Yet this view would mistakenly ignore the important asymmetry between positive and negative responses. 141 Constitutional language can constrain the development of theory, or
set the boundaries of theory-construction, without otherwise directing its development. Constitutional language can tell us when
we have gone too far without telling us anything else. The statement that "It doesn't mean that" need not necessarily occasion the
response "Then what does it mean?" I can know some of what a
term does not mean without knowing what it does mean, 142 just as
I can tell you quite confidently that "the theory of relativity" does
not mean "shirt collar" even though I have only the dimmest perception of what "the theory of relativity" does mean. 143
In this sense, we might do best to look at constitutional language as a frame without a picture, 144 or, better yet, a blank canvas. We know when we have gone off the edge of the canvas even
though the canvas itself gives us no guidance as to what to put on
it.
But if language constitutes the frame, then how does it do
that? The ordinary language associations of theory-laden terms
do not explain the frame-like quality of the words, because we
would not hesitate to extend freedom of speech to black armbands145 or oil paintings, although neither is "speech" in ordinary
141. This is at the heart of the assertion that scientific theories can be falsified, but
not verified. K. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS (1963); K. POPPER, THE
LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1959).
142. In one sense, of course, the more we know of what a term does not mean, the
more we know of what it does mean. But the point is that our ability to exclude some
possibilities is relatively independent of how many possibilities remain.
143. One might point out in response that I do know what "shirt collar" means,
and that is all I need to know that it is different from the theory of relativity. But I
could make the same assertion about knowing that there is a difference between
the theory of relativity and the Rule in Shelley's Case, although pace Professor
Michelman, I could no more tell you what the Rule in Shelley's Case is than I could
tell you what the theory of relativity is.
144. H. KELSEN, supra note 15, at 245.
145. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
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language. 146 Furthermore, we would have little difficulty in holding universal tongue-boring to be a violation of the eighth amendment, although the universality would prevent a finding that the
punishment was "unusual" in the ordinary language sense. 147 We
do, however, incorporate some very rough, pre-theoretical understandings into our sense of the limits of language. For example, it
is probably largely pre-theoretical that castration as a punishment
for jaywalking does not violate the principles of freedom of speech
and that a fine of $1.00 for criticizing the President does not violate the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 148 But this
helps very little in most real cases.
Perhaps, at best, we can only note the importance, as in all
development of language, of moving in small steps. Highly theory-laden constitutional language is like the ship, imagined by the
philosopher Neurath, which is to be rebuilt while afloat and therefore can only be rebuilt plank by plank. 149 So long as the ship
stays afloat during the process, it is no objection that the finished
product bears little or no resemblance to the original. With constitutional language, so long as the enterprise stays afloat it is no
objection that the current conception bears no close relation to the
ordinary language meaning of the text. 150 lf we have moved in
small steps from the original text, the enterprise stays afloat. The
question, then, is not necessarily whether the putative move is justified by the text, but whether the move is justified by the last
move.
In some ways, constitutional interpretation parallels some
theories of literary criticism. 151 In literary criticism, or indeed in
any artistic interpretation, we do not demand the uniquely correct
interpretation, but only an interpretation justified by the text. The
146. See Schauer, supra note 24, at 906-07; Schauer, Categories and the First
Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981).
147. The Court's eleventh amendment doctrine represents perhaps the most direct
repudiation of plain language to be found anywhere in constitutional law. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
148. For this point and the examples, 1 am indebted to Philip Devine.
149. W. QUINE, supra note 59, at 3. Neurath used the metaphor to illustrate the
progress of science.
150. This seems to be part of the thrust of Munzer & Nickel's "ancestral relation."
Munzer & Nickel, supra note 2, at 1054. Although the premises and conclusions are
different, there are important parallels with the dialectic process described by Michael
Perry. Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functional Justification, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278 (1981). See also Jones, The Brooding Omnipresence of
Constitutional Law, 4 VT. L. REV. 1 (1979); Monaghan, Professor Jones and the Constitution, 4 VT. L. REV. 87 (1979); Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1979).
151. The statement in the text is, to some extent, true even for "intentionalist"
theories, see Rader, supra note 88, but is even more true for "non-intentionalist" theories. See Fish, Facts and Fictions: A Reply to Ralph Rader, 1 CRITICAL INQUIRY 883
(1975). See a/so supra note 58.

830

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:797

paint or text underdetermines an interpretation (a theory) of an oil
painting or a literary work in the same way that the text of the
Constitution underdetermines a constitutional theory. 152 The interpretation must be plausibly coherent with the painting or the
text, but an interpretation cannot be uniquely derived from
the text or painting alone. Therefore no one interpretation is
uniquely acceptable, just as no constitutional theory is uniquely
acceptable in terms of the text. Although non-textual sources may
mandate a particular result, such a mandate is not the function of
the language. The language limits, but does not command.
The analogy with literary criticism should not be pressed too
far, because the literary critic has the freedom to select particularly important parts of his text for attention, a freedom not nearly
as available in constitutional interpretation. But the analogy does
effectively capture the relationship between flexibility and an authoritative text, a relationship that lies at the core of understanding the nature of constitutional adjudication.
Were this theory to be more fully developed, it might be said
to be horizontally clause-bound, but not vertically clausebound.153 That is, it recognizes, as more free-wheeling theories do
not, that the values specified in the text are more or less discrete,
and that they have a textual preeminence over values not so specified. In this sense, it is horizontally clause-bound because each
interpretation must derive originally from some particular portion
of the text or from some justified interpretation of that portion of
the text. It is vertically open because there is no limit on the
source from which we can derive the full theory for the textually
stated value, other than the intuitive, pre-theoretical limits placed
on that theory by the language. 154
These discrete constitutional values are like a series of funnels, separate from each other, but open to receive anything of the
right size that may be poured into the11_1. Of course, if we extend
the rims of the funnels too far, the funnels bump into each other,
and the important conceptual separation becomes difficult to
maintain. But that is a caution against the extremes, and not necessarily a crippling failure of the notion of conceptual separation.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 75-90.
153. 1 draw the term "clause-bound" from J. H. ELY, supra note 1. Ely uses the
term to refer to interpretation that views constitutional provisions as (a) self-contained units and (b) capable of interpretation on the basis of the language and the
legislative history alone. Id at 12-13. Ely's theory substitutes his view of the underlying theme of the entire document (which he gets from the document itself) for both (a)
and (b). 1 describe my suggestions as horizontally clause-bound because 1 accept (a),
more or less, but reject (b). Underlying my idea is the assumption that if we stick
moderately close to (a) we can reject (b) without suffering most of the dangers ofnoninterpretivism that Ely properly identified.
154. See supra text accompanying note 148.
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Courts must supply content to those theory-laden terms that send
us outside the domain of legal knowledge and legal discourse.
That content need not come from philosophy (as argued by Dworkin1ss and Richards 1S6) or from history (as argued by Berger 157 ) or
from somewhere else. As I have argued in this Essay, the conventions of language demonstrate that Berger's extreme form of historical reference and even the more mild forms of historical
interpretation 158 are mistaken as a matter of textual derivation.
Historical reference is neither mandated nor implicit in a permanently authoritative constitutional text. But although the text does
not require a reference to history, it does not necessarily prohibit
such reference. The text requires that we supply the theory, but
there may be extra-textual, or extra-constitutional, reasons for
constructing it from one source rather than from another. History
is one possible source, but not the only possible source, and the
same can be said for moral philosophy, or political policy, or any
other source of values.
CONCLUSION

The Constitution has been written in a language, and a user
of language must be taken to know and intend that the language is
open to interpretation. Although a user of language has intentions
that are relevant in determining what the user meant to say, the
user has no power to veto the conventions of the language that
have been used. Constitutional interpretations can change because the linguistic conventions and presuppositions change, even
though the words remain the same. 159 Thus, a fixed reference to
history or original intent seems curious. Even historians expect to
interpret the past anew for each generation, 160 because perspective, and therefore meaning, is mutable. Of course, our craving
for certainty 161 may cause us to search for the immutable. This is
155. See supra text accompanying notes 153-54.
156. See supra note 75 & accompanying text.
157. See supra note 27.
158. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, Tlte "Right" to Vote, and
the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 33.
159. One reason that literal and historical approaches tend to be conjoined, see
supra note 50, is that the meaning of words cb,mges over time. Without the historical
supplement, most literal approaches would be far less concrete than the literalist usually desires. Although I cannot explore the issue fully here, I am inclined to argue
that language change is one of the conventions accepted by a user of language, especially one who puts language into an authoritative text. This argument touches more
deeply on the very nature of law than is appropriate here.
160. "Historically oriented critics seem curiously reluctant to follow the lead of
most historians, who expect to reinterpret the past and its works for each generation."
P. JoNES, supra note 57, at 185. See generally Passmore, Tlte Objectivity ofHistory, in·
THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 145 (P. Gardiner ed. 1974).
.
161. "[C]ertainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of mankind."
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most apparent in law, where the myth of certainty has a persistent
appeal. 162 But the law cannot be certain, in large part because
language itself is not certain. What is unfortunate is that quixotic
quests for certainty are likely to interfere with more fruitful quests
for an intelligent understanding of the causes and management of
our uncertainty.
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